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Abstract 
Development of advanced Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) system-
enabled weapons and combat systems for deployment in the U.S. Navy has become a reality. 
This is also true for the other armed forces, as well as in homeland security and even the Coast 
Guard. From the Navy standpoint, the Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA) is 
attempting to get ahead of the acquisition cycle by focusing on the development of policies, 
guidelines, tools, and techniques to assess mishap risk in Safety Significant Functions (SSF) 
that are identified. NOSSA’s efforts have the potential of influencing the acquisition community, 
including in requirements, development, and test and evaluation engineering. This paper makes 
recommendations for the Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) and Subsystem Hazard Analysis 
(SSHA) analysis templates and focuses on ways to decrease autonomy within system 
operations and increase its correlated Software Control Category (SCC). The questions and 
discussions devised from this research aim to form guidance and offer best practices to address 
AI/ML system safety issues. 
Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is rapidly approaching the point where system safety 
practitioners will need to conduct mishap risk assessments on AI functions within upgraded 
systems being deployed in the Fleet. These systems will be crucial to ensure the DoD retains its 
dominance in military power (Brose, 2020). The safety community will soon be required to 
conduct system safety analysis on systems, including weapon systems that contain Artificial 
Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) functionality (National Defense Authorization Act 
[NDAA], 2021; National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence [NSCAI], 2021). AI 
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functions present unique challenges to system safety practitioners to identify hazards, assess 
risk, and identify risk mitigation measures. This includes how to properly employ a system with 
AI capability in an operational or tactical environment while reducing the probability of a mishap. 
Currently, no guidance exists on how to conduct system safety analysis on AI/ML functions, and 
this will prevent the certification of these systems for deployment (Naval Sea Systems 
Command [NAVSEA], 2008; National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2019).  
The Problem 
Assuring safety in AI/ML systems is a considerable challenge to current safety 
processes for traditional software. Traditional software can be assessed for safety through code 
review, and traditional software outcomes can be analyzed through automated code analysis 
techniques such as Modified Condition/Decision Coverage (Joint Software Systems Safety 
Engineering Workgroup, 2017). Together, these and other methods can provide a rigorous 
understanding of how software will function in a given situation, assuring some desired level of 
safety. However, a developed and trained AI/ML system cannot be analyzed with current 
analysis methods, and though it is theoretically possible for some ML designs (and completely 
impossible for others) to exhaustively test all inputs and outputs of an AI/ML software function, 
the calculation time required makes even small systems almost impossible to analyze. These 
issues, combined with the unique challenge of unpredictable real-world corner cases, result in 
AI/ML functions having an inherent lack of safety due to unknown, unanalyzable, and untestable 
factors (Sodhani, 2018). 
Within the DoD, MIL-STD-882E guides the software safety process. This standard 
provides a method for categorizing safety significant software based on its level of autonomy, 
called the Software Control Category (SCC). SCC 1, Autonomous, defines the highest level of 
autonomy, while SCC 4, Influential, defines the least autonomous category of safety significant 
software. These SCCs are combined with the severity of related hazards to define a Software 
Criticality Index (SwCI). Each SwCI level requires a requisite Level of Rigor (LOR), or a specific 
set of tasks to be completed before that safety significant software is considered “safe,” or 
representing a certain level of acceptable risk for the system. SwCI 1 requires the most effort to 
achieve LOR, while SwCI 4 requires the least amount of effort to achieve LOR. 
For software where functional failure could lead to catastrophic hazards and that either 
has control over safety significant hardware or provides safety-critical information, the safest 
SCC possible is SCC 3, Redundant Fault Tolerant, which results in SwCI 2 (MIL-STD-882E; 
Defense Standardization Program Office, 2012). If this function were instead SCC 1, 
Autonomous, or SCC 2, Semi-Autonomous, the resulting SwCI would be 1. In addition to the 
SwCI 2 LOR tasks, SwCI 1 LOR tasking additionally requires code level analysis, such as 
including MC/DC or equivalent testing (JS-SSA, 2017). This means that if the Safety Significant 
Function (SSF) that could lead to a catastrophic hazard is an AI/ML function, it would likely be 
impossible to perform full LOR tasking on that function, creating a considerable gap in software 
safety.  
The Need 
Unless new analysis techniques are developed that can address the specific issues 
described previously, the most effective way to increase confidence of safe operations in AI/ML 
systems is to decrease the safety significance of AI software. Per MIL-STD-882E, this can be 
accomplished by lowering the potential mishap Severity or the SCC of the function. The SCC is 
used to define the level of control that software has over SSFs. The higher the number (from 1 
to 5), the less safety impact the software has. For catastrophic hazards where the software 
either has control over safety significant hardware or provides safety-critical information, SCC 3 
is the safest possible category and should be the goal for all traditional and AI software 
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functions. There is increased difficulty in reaching this SCC for AI/ML, however, due to the fact 
that in many applications of AI/ML, the AI system is independent (autonomous) and may be the 
only system that reviews data and makes decisions based on that data (Sodhani, 2018). 
In addition to this, the many uses of AI/ML throughout government and industry do not 
follow defined procedures for guaranteeing safe operations. The current processes used to 
determine how safe AI/ML software is, and the processes used to decrease the risk of hazards 
due to or involving AI/ML, vary widely and are not consistent between companies and 
government agencies (NSCAI, 2019). These varied approaches not only result in inconsistency 
and lack of safety rigor in deployed systems, but they also decrease trust in AI/ML technology. 
To address both of these issues, consistent approaches to AI/ML system safety analysis must 
be developed. 
In many modern implementations of AI/ML, there are neither components nor systems in 
place that actively decrease the autonomy level of these specially developed software functions.  
Figure 1 describes the process for performing a Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA), 
which is the primary analysis used to determine SCC and SwCI determinations for safety 
significant software. In reviewing Figure 1, several questions are posed with regard to AI/ML:  
• Are unique tools needed because of the presence of AI/ML to complete this analysis?  
• How would we complete this determination for an AI/ML deployed system? 
• Are current SwCI definitions appropriate for AI/ML? 
These questions, alongside proposed answers and solutions to them, are presented in this 
paper.  
 
Figure 1. FHA Workflow 
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The Goal 
This paper focuses on how to identify an AI safety critical function, gives 
recommendations to reduce the function’s autonomy level, provides a format on how LOR for an 
AI/ML function can be identified, and includes some initial examples of AI/ML unique tasks for 
LOR. The goal of the research is to provide processes, questions, discussion points, and 
insights regarding the organization of the safety analysis in the form of tables and specifically 
labeled column headings. These structures and format recommendations are in support of 
system safety practitioners, providing guidance on how to conduct rigorous safety analysis on 
AI/ML software functions being deployed in weapon (MIL-STD-882E; Defense Standardization 
Program Office, 2012) or aircraft (DO-178C; Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, 
2012) systems. The paper provides, in table format and related recommendations, examples of 
two system safety analyses, the FHA and Subsystem Hazard Analysis (SSHA).  
A complete list of SSHA LOR task descriptions that arose from our analysis will be 
available through other Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA) documented 
sources. This research, funded by NOSSA, will provide recommendations to be considered by 
NOSSA. These recommendations are to help better understand the robustness of the model 
being developed, especially if that model resides within an SSF. This paper makes 
recommendations for FHA and SSHA templates and related considerations to facilitate system 
safety analyses on AI/ML functions with a focus on ways to decrease the autonomy within 
system operations and increase their correlated SCCs. The questions and discussions devised 
from this research aim to form guidance and offer best practices to address AI/ML system safety 
issues. 
Use Case to Investigate 
When considering an operational use case to implement within our sandbox development 
environment, our first step was to create a stakeholder’s analysis table, as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Stakeholder’s Analysis Table 
 
From a review of Table 1, it became obvious that current system safety analysis 
methodologies (MIL-STD-882E; Defense Standardization Program Office, 2012) were 
inadequate to address the unique system safety needs of AI/ML functions. New methodologies 
would be required to ensure comprehensive system safety analysis of AI/ML functions. In order 
to conduct research to develop new methodologies, the effort focused on developing a fictional 
system that implemented various AI/ML functions, allowing the system safety team to 
investigate gaps in current methodologies when analyzing these specially developed functions. 
The fictional system would have to replicate parts of the acquisition cycle in detail. To support 
realism in our fabricated system, various ongoing development efforts within various project and 
programs in early to late research phases were modified and then combined into an ML hybrid 
mission planner and a multi-ML algorithm robot technology. Again, it should be emphasized that 
although the program is fictitious, technology architecture, design, code, and test were based on 
existing research in the field of AI/ML currently being performed by various naval commands. 
# Name/Org Type Want/Need Concern/Loss Notes
1 Safety Engineer/NAWCWD D511000 Analyst Suite of defined LOR tasks and OQE Guilt/Liability from loss of life Knows that AI system is Safety Significant but no LOR tool set available
2 Safety Engineer/Contractor(Weapon System Supplier) Analyst Suite of defined LOR tasks and OQE Guilt/Liability from loss of life
Knows that AI system is Safety Significant but no LOR tool 
set available
3 Warfighter User Assurance of weapon system safety Guilt/Liability from loss of life Assumes that AI system is safe; unaware of lack of safety rigor
4 WSESRB Member Analyst Suite of defined LOR tasks and OQE Guilt/Liability from loss of life Knows that AI system is Safety Significant but no LOR tool set available
5 Program Manager Sponsor Assurance of weapon system safety Guilt/Liability from loss of life Pressured to meet military requirement; accepts safety risk
6 Civilian or Military Victim of Mishap Neutral Observer Safety in Battle Space as Non-Target Personal Death or Injury Unaware of Latent Safety Hazard
7 American Public Neutral Observer Assurance that weapon systems will not kill or injur friendlies or non-combatants Anger/Disapproval "How could this tragedy happen?"  "Who is responsible?""Why was a dangerous weapon system deployed by the US 
8 NOSSA, PM Sponsor, Developers What processes and policy associated with the various phases of the acquisition 
cycle will be needed to support system safety for AI/ML software? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system, 
PM: Added cost to retrofit safer 
9 NOSSA Sponsor
What tools, guidance and documentation would need to be created to support the 
processes and policy per each group’s needs? Groups: Developers need from 
system safety, System safety practitioners from system safety and Oversight folks 
from system safety.
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
10 NOSSA Sponsor Along with the processes, what analytics need investigation for each user group? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
11 NOSSA Sponsor How would various AI/ML software designs affect the analytical approach? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
12 NOSSA Sponsor What kind of OQE is required per a given AI/ML technique and implementation 
structure to support a program moving forward? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
13 NOSSA Sponsor Will data and analytics be considered as separate pieces to inspect? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
14 NOSSA Sponsor
During a WSESRB or Technical Review Panel review that involves AI/ML, how would 
systems, data and numbers be presented to allow for proper investigation and 
analysis to ensure contextual accuracy based on group technical background? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
15 NOSSA Sponsor What are the factors and limitations associated with confidence of numbers 
presented regarding AI/ML performance? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
16 NOSSA Sponsor AI/ML performance is always associated within the context of the training data? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
17 NOSSA Sponsor
What does it mean to perform architecture, design, or code analysis (see MIL-STD-
882E Table V) with an AI/ML system, especially when, for example, even the 
developer has limited understanding on how the neural network works? 
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
18 NOSSA Sponsor
How will confidence be assured for each user group in terms of how the software 
will perform as specified to AI performance requirements (see MIL-STD-882E 
paragraph 4.4.1.b)?
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
19 NOSSA Sponsor What would be the type of contractual language associated with AI/ML 
integration/deployment?
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
20 NOSSA Sponsor
 Should it include the complete system because of potential reduction in overall 
system maturity? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
21 NOSSA Sponsor
Will AI/ML algorithms exponentially increase the complexity of the system under 
review affecting hardware issues involved with processing, bandwidth and storage? 
If not considered, will performance degrade, causing system safety concerns? How 
will this be analyzed? What are the limitations associated with confidence of 
numbers presented regarding AI/ML performance? Note: AI/ML performance is 
always associated within the context of the training data.
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
22 NOSSA Sponsor
What format will allow technical and non- AI/ML technical stakeholders to support 
discussion, understanding and eventual application for their particular AI/ML 
situation? This sets the requirement for how processes and policy should be 
technically written and displayed while still supporting the necessary detail. It is 
anticipated that each group will have a different set of requirements for 
communicating and displaying technical detail related to guidance. What will be the 
training requirements for each group?different set of requirements for 
communicating and displaying technical detail related to guidance. What will be the 
training requirements for each group?
NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
23 NOSSA Sponsor 1. how do we build confidence in the AI black box? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
24 NOSSA Sponsor
2. How do we build rigor into, or is it necessary to build rigor into, the training code 
for the AI? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
25 NOSSA Sponsor Is this the appropriate AI technique to use and is there an non-AI technique that could be used? NOSSA: Unsafe deployed system
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 30 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
An Operational Use Case was identified that had the potential to provide answers 
described in Table 1’s stakeholder analysis. Not only did it need to support answers to the 
questions posed in Table 1, but the operational used case also needed to be constructed from 
realistic aspects of AI/ML technology. An operational view of the Use Case is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Operational Use Case of Two Robots Delivering Packages 
Figure 2 is based on the following considerations involving the Operational Scenario, the 
Operational/Deployed Environment, and Key SSFs: 
The Operational Scenario 
• The design consists of the following subsystems: (1) Two Robots, which are identical in 
performance, (2) Two Pickup Trucks, which are identical in performance, and (3) a Mission 
Planner. 
• The two robots are carried a partial way to their destination on the two pickup trucks. After 
the pickup trucks arrive at their destination, each robot will be unloaded from their respective 
pickup trucks. From the unload point, the robots will walk synchronously to arrive and deliver 
their packages to the single intended recipient at the same time. The two robots are able to 
walk long distances using GPS navigation, and as the robots gets closer to the subject 
receiving the package, a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) image recognition algorithm 
using color spectrum and infrared images from an EO/IR sensor on the robot will take over 
navigation. The special GPS navigation is pre-loaded with waypoints produced by an AI/ML 
trained mission-planning tool.  
The Operational/Deployed Environment 
• It could be a rainy day when the robots are deployed. Weather conditions, houses, and 
buildings all result in background clutter and obstacles for the navigation system. There are 
cars and pickup trucks on the road, including other robots and people walking, complex 
highway systems, and city-like sidewalks and walkways that need to be navigated by the 
two robots. Many other people, some looking very similar in side profile to the recipient, in 
this scenario are part of the environment. It is important that people should not receive this 
package by mistake, as the packages are hazardous and very valuable. Delivering a 
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package to the wrong recipient will be a Catastrophic mishap. Thus, it is important to system 
safety that sufficient mitigations are incorporated into the system to minimize the risk of an 
incorrect person receiving the package by mistake from either robot. 
Key Safety Significant Functions 
• Navigation. The navigation system of the robots uses a special GPS function following 
waypoints and then switches to an AI-based seeker function at a certain range from the 
recipient. The AI-based seeker function uses polar coordinates instead of waypoints to 
navigate. The AI/ML navigation system must avoid obstacles, as mentioned previously, 
during navigation. Some obstacles might include other people attempting to steal the 
package carried by a robot. The AI-based seeker does not take over navigation until a 
separate switching function determines when the robot is at a certain distance from the 
recipient. Once this switch is activated, robot navigation is turned over to the CNN function 
for final navigation to the recipient. The non-AI navigation is responsible for avoiding 
obstacles in route until the CNN takes over navigation. Again, once within a certain range of 
the recipient, the seeker function is switched on to take over the complete navigation of the 
system. The seeker function consists of a CNN, designed to recognize side profiles of the 
recipient, and avoid obstacles. The CNN is trained using synthetic images of side profiles 
within a synthetic clutter environment. The CNN is trained to navigate in such a way as to 
avoid people attempting to steal its package. While in a traditional system, package theft 
would be considered a security issue and not a safety issue, the team decided to identify 
this as a system safety concern to allow investigation of the CNN function. 
• Sensor Data. Each robot is receiving non-curated data from a 3-D sensor. The sensor 
streams a color scaled set of images that contain complex backgrounds at a certain 
sampling rate for database storage and CNN processing. Images are stored in a separate 
database for each robot with no data sharing between robots.  
• Image Recognition. There is a large amount of synthetic data available for training and 
some actual images of recipients’ side profiles. Unfortunately, the added clutter to the image 
is also synthetic (i.e., building and house backgrounds, day and night lighting, rain, etc.; see 
previous Operational/Deployed Environment section.) The developer is also considering a 
transfer learning approach to add another classification layer to the CNN to increase the 
probability of successful recognition.  
• Timing Synchronization. Timing synchronization is implemented using reinforced learning, 
with real time updates to the Mechanics Reinforced Learning (RL) Dynamics Manager 
neural network that affects the physics of the robots in terms of direction and speed. Both 
robots must deliver their packages at the same time, but they can take different routes to 
avoid environmental conditions. Once a robot delivers a package, the recipient will not wait 
for the second package. Therefore, it is important that both packages be delivered at the 
same time to avoid the recipient leaving and the possibility of the second robot delivering its 
package to someone who should not receive the package. Again, this is a significant system 
safety concern because delivery of a package to an incorrect recipient is considered a 
catastrophic mishap. 
Sandbox Development Environment Approach 
Within the sandbox development environment, a variety of AI/ML algorithms supporting 
a mission planner and autonomous vehicle selection and navigation were developed—again 
inspired by existing AI/ML projects and programs. Formal Department of Defense Architecture 
Framework (DoDAF) (Department of Defense Chief Information Officer [DoD CIO], n.d.; Dam, 
2006) and Unified Modeling Language (UML; Booch, 2017) diagrams were created to support a 
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System of Systems (SoS) design, including interface messages, SQL commands and 
Application Programming Interfaces (API). Using this sandbox approach allowed an initial top-
down safety analysis, starting with system decomposition and traceability from an Operational 
View (OV), through a Systems View (SV), and then finally down to the algorithm’s code level 
supporting the specific AI/ML being implemented. This process was used to provide a broad 
scope representation of a potential DoD program implementing AI/ML and to "realistically” 
investigate conduct of the FHA and SSHA methodologies on a variety of AI/ML functions. 
Figure 3 represents the subsystems associated with the mission planner and robot. 
 
Figure 3. Robot and Mission Planner Subsystems 
The goal of the sandbox development environment was to implement a variety of AI/ML 
technologies that worked together as an SoS, offering a variety of ML approaches to investigate 
(Hastie et al., 2017). The mission planner provides analysis of the following AI/ML technologies: 
• The Naïve Bayes and Logistic Regression algorithms receive sensor and human input 
data in order to select the appropriate type of meta-model from a repository. 
• The Random Forest algorithm, by creating a “Similarity Table” between branches of 
trees (and its counterpart “Distance Table” for other ML algorithms using distance 
analysis), allows for data estimation for missing data within the meta-model tables that 
was not originally identified in the Design of Experiment (DOE) simulation requirements. 
Therefore, the Random Forest can account for the challenges when the Modeling and 
Simulation (M&S) is missing inputs needed for a meta-model. Predicting the deployed 
operational future is difficult for a variety of reasons. Random Forest clustering allows 
estimation in situations with both limited inputs and an unknown statistical output. This 
allowed for greater flexibility in the mission planner’s ability to adapt in non-ideal 
operational environments.  
• The minimax, per meta-model selected, looks at the factors needing to be addressed in 
completing the mission, including tactical capability, external challenges and delivery 
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issues. Based on sensor data, it selects “worst” case scenario and then finds the “best” 
case autonomous performance combined with tactical sequence needed to successfully 
complete the mission. “Worst” case and “best” case are represented by statistical 
structures within the route leg’s meta-model counterpart. 
• The meta-model tables are processed through the Random Forest approach and a 
minimax algorithm to determine the statistics for each leg in the route. Then a non-linear 
optimization program determines the optimal selection of robots and routes. 
The robots’ autonomous platform provides analysis of the following AI/ML technologies: 
• Deep Neural Network (DNN) - supports the mechanical motion of the robot given various 
states. The states are determined based on real time input conditions of the robot 
movement. Input conditions include traveling surface and conditions. Based on the 
attributes received, the DNN would use a control feedback mechanism to adjust its 
walking mechanics. For example, if the robot, through the CNN, recognizes that it is 
about to approach the package recipient, it would slow down, unsecure the package, 
and extend its arms to show the package. While traveling, the package would be secure. 
Upon understanding its current travel state, the robot would use DNN to determine which 
mechanical state to implement. It should be noted that the sandbox will also be 
investigating how Deep RL might apply. 
• Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) - supports the recognition of the recipient. The 
input would be based on facial recognition. The result of this analysis would be input to 
the DNN in terms of its mechanical functions, as discussed previously. 
It should be noted that the sandbox is still in development. Design analysis of all AI/ML 
functions described previously has been completed. Implementation is ongoing. This paper’s 
findings are based on sandbox development environment investigations, as well as from 
previous game theory, DNN and CNN research with other projects. 
AI Type Definition 
There are many opinions surrounding the definition of AI. For this research, we defined 
the term “AI Type.” We defined an AI Type to be identified by objective measurements. 
Therefore, if a function is determined to be an AI Type based on its score from the following 
objective measurements, it requires special FHA and SSHA investigation. The definition and 
scoring are as follows: 
AI Type (Working Definition): For system safety concerns, an AI Type of function means that an 
algorithm will be developed:  
(1) using data approximations to build its algorithm (e.g., from simulations and synthetic 
data vs. an equation that accurately represents real world physics) and/or  
(2) when data samples used to build its algorithm are a subset of the actual population size 
(e.g., training data samples from population to support machine learning, training data 
samples requiring clutter backgrounds). 
Scoring: For all functions that are candidates for being implemented using an AI/ML algorithm 
(examples in table), then each function must be graded using criteria (1) or (2), with 
corresponding points awarded. A final score of 1 or greater indicates that the function is an AI 
Type. 
Table 2 represents examples of scoring based on various AI Types. It is not intended to 
be a complete list. The goal here is not to provide the system safety practitioner with a complete 
list, but to aid the practitioner based on a practical scoring approach. 
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Table 2. Example of Scoring Based on AI Type Definition 
 
The AI Type definition allows for a productive, focused discussion between the system 
safety practitioner and the function developer. Questions that might initiate the conversation 
would include: 
• What parts of the system need special rigor consideration (as compared to traditional 
algorithm code development)? 
• Does the SSF identified qualify as an AI/ML function? 
It is especially important to investigate if the function is an AI Type when an algorithm is 
identified as a safety-critical function using an FHA approach. Again, the hypothesis is that it is 
an AI Type function if 
• (Consideration 1) it uses data approximations to build/train its algorithm (e.g., data 
approximations can come from simulations and synthetic data vs. an equation that 
accurately represents real world physics), and/or  
• (Consideration 2) data samples are used to build/design its algorithm and these data sample 
are a subset of the actual population size (e.g., training data samples from population to 
support machine learning, training data samples requiring clutter backgrounds). 
One way to think about consideration (1) is to ask, “Could another developer create a 
different set of statistics under the same conditions?” If no, then maybe this algorithm is not an 
AI Type. If yes, then it meets the condition. As an example, if a statistical model of the function 
was developed, how accurate were the approximations used in creating the function. In other 
words, how close do these approximations fit the real world physics regarding operational 
deployment? If the function is based on simulation results, then the concern is the “garbage in, 
garbage out” issue—poor real world representative synthetic data will result in an inferior model. 
The goal is to have good quality and comprehensive training data that would result in a robust 
model. 
One way to think about consideration (2) is to ask, “What is the actual population size of 
the training set?” If the training set is equal to the actual population size, then it is not an AI 
Type. Consider the most basic ML algorithm, a regression line. If all the points that will ever 
occur for this function are on the scatter plot used to approximate the curve, why use a 
regression line? If all the ML algorithm inputs and outputs are known, why use ML and not 
traditional code? Again, if traditional code can address the needs of the function, then that 
would be the goal. 
Notice that both considerations are related. It is like looking at two sides of the same 
coin: how ML algorithms are developed and why they need to be avoided in critical functions. 
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Figure 4 describes the need to separate out AI Type designated functions from 
traditionally developed software coded functions. 
 
Figure 4. Flow to Assess AI Type Using Special FHA and SSHA Rigor 
Six Recommendations to Assess AI Type Functions 
This paper describes six recommendations. The first three are associated with the FHA 
assessment, and the last three involve the SSHA analysis. The FHA recommendations are 
provided in the form of a complete list of columns to use during the development of the FHA. It 
is noted that the current FHA approach works well in identifying the safety significance of a 
function. As shown in Table 3, three columns have been added in support of the three 
recommendations focused on reducing autonomy. The last three recommendations are in 
support of doing an SSHA. One recommendation is in structuring the table, with an added 
column regarding the focus of the analysis. The final two recommendations offer a list of 
questions listed as line items within the table focused on (1) API/MSG/SQL interface corruption 
to the ML algorithm and (2) modality of how well the data training the algorithm represents 
deployed conditions. The fifth recommendation addresses the interface to the algorithm and 
asks questions involved with how data corruption might need to be addressed within the training 
data composition of the ML algorithm. The sixth recommendation is in regards to the modality of 
how the training data is gathered, organized and managed, known as curation. If the training 
data isn’t curated properly, the ML algorithm may not function properly. In either case, interface 
corruption or poor curation, a safety critical ML function could have a greater likelihood of 
becoming a hazard. 
Functional Hazard Analysis 
Prior to addressing the first three recommendations, the initial steps of the functional 
hazard analysis (FHA) need to have been completed to identify the safety significance of the 
functions (JS-SSA Rev. A, 2017). It should be noted that the system safety analysis found no 
gaps in the FHA process in identifying the safety significance of a function when dealing with an 
AI/ML function. This is because the identification of the Severity, SCC, and resulting SwCI does 
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not change when dealing with an AI/ML function. At this stage, it does not matter whether the 
function has AI/ML capability in it or not.  
An example of an FHA regarding our Use Case example for mission planning is described in 
Table 3. 
Table 3. FHA Example for Mission Planner From Sandbox 
 
Recommendation 1: Once an FHA identifies the SSFs, each function needs to be assessed 
using the AI Type definition following these three steps: 
(1) For each identified SSF that potentially has AI/ML within, identify the algorithm that will 
be used to support that function, and then document the grade each function receives in 
terms of AI Type definition (see previous section on AI Type scoring and definitions).  
(2) If the function scores either 1 or 2 (i.e., it is an AI Type), describe what specific AI/ML 
algorithm is going to be trained/implemented. 
(3) If the specific algorithm is using DNN structures (i.e., three or more layers), identify if 
there is enough training data to support this approach and, if not, were older ML 
algorithms considered, like Logistic Regression, kNNs, etc. 
If function qualifies as an AI Type, follow these two recommendations: 
Recommendation 2: Verify that an AI/ML function is needed by asking the following questions: 
a) For AI Type definition 1: Can the algorithm be traditionally built using data 
approximations? Why or why not?  
b) For AI Type definition 2: Can the algorithm be broken into subpopulations to allow 
development of traditional code? Why or why not?  
Recommendation 3: Justify that an AI/ML function needs to be Autonomous by documenting the 
following: 
a) Document how the design can or cannot include a human in the loop or traditional 
hardware/software technology to provide checks and balances. 
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b) If it cannot provide checks and balances, provide documentation as to operational 
limitations by: 
1. Describing weaknesses of each AI/ML technique (e.g., expected success rate of the 
function). For example, if AI/ML is built on data approximations (using AI Type 
definition), how much bias will the data approximations add to the functional 
outcome? Or if AI/ML is built on data samples (using AI Type definition), how 
representative are the samples to the population? 
2. Determining how the training data is being generated (e.g., truth, synthetic, 
combination). Are these sources valid? Why? 
3. Where is the training data coming from? Is it enough? (Remember the more 
sophisticated the AI/ML software, the more likely that it needs larger amounts of 
training data.) 
4. Will an outside independent source review the training, validation and test data 
created? Why or why not? 
5. Will an outside independent source validate the success rate of the AI/ML function as 
compared to other AI/ML functions used in industry? Why or why not? 
SSHA 
Table 4 and Table 5 show analysis of one of the AI/ML functions in the sandbox, a 17-
attribute, five-class Naïve Bayes algorithm for meta-model selection that implements statistically 
independent instances representing missing and sparse data operational issues. In our 
sandbox, we used 15,000 samples of training data to support classification training of Logistic 
Regression and Random Forest algorithms. Our analysis is independent of the categorization 
algorithm selected but focuses on how to assess it in terms of identifying hazards at the 
subsystem level. Naïve Bayes is used in the example to remove focus on the algorithm 
complexity and place it on the recommendations being offered. 
Recommendation 4: Table 4 identifies the hazard description and, again, provides a similar 
table approach to non-AI functions under investigation.  
Table 4. SSHA for Meta-Model Selection Algorithm Within Mission Planner From Sandbox 
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Recommendation 5: For system safety practitioners, Table 5 might also look familiar. 
The recommendation is to add a single column labeled “Focus” that categorizes the LOR list of 
descriptions that might be unique to ML algorithm development. Notice that the list of LOR 
Descriptions is based on the “Focus” described. It is a simple recommendation, but from our 
research within the sandbox, it helps organize the range of issues that might occur. For every AI 
Type identified in the FHA, it is recommended that an interface analysis be considered, as 
described in Table 5, using the LOR Description column. Each row in this LOR Description 
column provides API/MSG/SQL interface questions that might affect the algorithm’s 
performance during deployment, as will be explained next.  
Table 5. SSHA LOR Table Example Based on Data Flow Analysis of Meta-Model Selection Within the 
Mission Planner 
 
To understand whether the ML Algorithm was trained properly to handle issues based on 
interface corruption, the following six questions (in sequential rows) are recommended based on 
our sandbox analysis: 
1. Would the corruption of the API/MSG/SQL/Other affect data variations requiring 
additional training of the AI/ML Algorithm? This is a yes or no answer. 
2. If yes, will quality (composition/complexity/structure) of Training Data significantly 
increase? Will it affect the ML Training Modality? Explain this specific to the 
API/MSG/SQL/Other. Corruption might result in a need to add secondary or tertiary 
sources. It might also affect how data is collected from various sources, potentially 
changing the ML Training Modality.  
3. Will these variations be part of the analysis for selecting the "best" algorithm? Explain. 
ROC sweet spot analysis might be used with hyper parameter changes based on the 
type of variation. 
4. Because of this issue, will quantity (more instances) of Training Data significantly 
increase? Explain this specific to the API/MSG/SQL/Other. This could result in a need to 
have more of a certain type of instance to train on based on mixes of primary, 
secondary, or tertiary attribute requirements. 
5. Will creating/finding enough training data replicating API/MSG/SQL/Other corruption be 
an issue? Explain. If it is synthetic, is may not be an issue, depending on the model. If it 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 39 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
comes from “live” data, then would there be more training data associated with the 
effects of the corruption? 
6. Is there confidence that any additional data created/found will adequately represent the 
effects associated with replicating the corruption? Explain. This is an important 
statement related to the quality (composition/complexity/structure) of the Training Data. 
Recommendation 6: Another series of rows has been added to Table 5 based on modality 
associated with the training data. Table 6 provides additional questions for the algorithm 
developer and data analytics engineer to address based on modality regarding how the ML is 
trained. 
Table 6. Investigation Questions Based on Modality 
 
A brief summary of modality types that support training data composition and size are described 
next: 
• ML Training Data Modality 1: This modality supports training data sets that are based on 
an operational environment from multiple data sources, where each source contains one 
or more attributes. The various sources of separate data attributes are either found from 
live events or synthetic simulations created to match the deployed operational scenario. 
Therefore, the input for the ML algorithm for training needs to replicate the input that will 
be received during deployment. 
• ML Training Data Modality 2: Training data sets that are based on an operational 
environment from a single data source, where the single data source contains multiple 
data attributes. The one stream set of aggregated attributes is either found from live 
events or synthetic simulations created to match the deployed operational scenario. 
Therefore, the input for the ML algorithm for training needs to replicate the input during 
deployment.  
• ML Training Data Modality 3: Training data sets that are based on an operational 
environment from a combination of multiple data sources where each source contains 
one or more attributes form various sources and from a single source containing multiple 
aggregated data attributes. It is a combination of Modality 1 and 2 that the algorithm 
uses for categorization or regression.  
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Conclusions and Final Best Practice Recommendations 
Our findings indicate that the FHA and SSHA for AI/ML SSFs need to be addressed 
differently from traditional functional analysis methods. To address these differences, the AI 
Type definition and scoring approach was introduced, along with six recommendations 
regarding the FHA and SSHA. The research describes questions/issues needing to be 
addressed when conducting safety analysis on AI/ML function types. It includes discussion on 
how the current FHA process is still valid for AI/ML functions and only requires three additional 
columns to support added justification that an AI/ML function is required to meet operational 
goals. The SSHA discussion provides a simple table modification and two examples of LOR 
Descriptions that need to be addressed when dealing with AI/ML critical functions: (1) interfaces 
to the algorithm to understand the impact of potential data corruption, and (2) modality issues to 
ensure robust curation of the data to ensure the algorithm is trained to meet deployment 
challenges.  
Along with the AI Type scoring and six recommendations associated with the analysis of 
critical functions, there were complementary “Best Practice” questions that arose from our 
sandbox development environment when developing AI/ML algorithms within a deployed 
weapons system. 
“Best Practice” areas to consider specific to AI/ML critical functions include: 
General AI/ML Questions: 
• When a critical function is identified, does it meet the AI Type definition criteria: (1) Is the 
algorithm built based on using data approximations, and/or (2) is the algorithm built 
based on using data samples from larger populations? 
• When doing M&S to create the training data, does the simulation adequately represent 
Classes for the ML process? If not, how are Classes represented? 
• Does each Class have a sufficient number of attributes that can be learned by the 
algorithm for that Class? Are overfitting and underfitting considered for that Class with 
regards to the quantity of attributes simulated and does that reflect real world 
operations? 
• How do we know that the M&S creating the training data is aligned with the mission 
parameters? Was a traceability study performed to ensure adequate coverage? Have 
statistics been developed to show how many configurations exist and how many were 
trained using primary, secondary, and tertiary data sources? How are we avoiding 
overfitting and underfitting based on primary, secondary, and tertiary training data mixes 
and sets? Is the training data organized in terms of primary, secondary, and tertiary 
attributes to be able to represent missing and sparse data priorities from related 
sources? 
• How are we ensuring that the algorithm being deployed provides the correct answer 
when data input issues occur? Is the algorithm success rate determined by primary, 
secondary, and tertiary attributes? 
• Can other control entities (such as a human operator) be inserted into the loop to reduce 
the SCC? 
Operational “Realism” Questions: 
• Is the M&S able to create training data that represents reality when sparse and missing 
data issues occur? 
• Does the architecture, design, and code support sparse and missing data management; 
specifically, does it filter or select less significant attributes to do the calculations? 
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• Does the data management support filtering to ensure the ML algorithm is provided 
accurate data input, avoiding “garbage in, garbage out?” Has what constitutes “garbage 
in, garbage out” been defined? 
• How well does the particular ML algorithm support increased complexity, and how does 
that affect sparse and missing data issues? 
Selected AI/ML Algorithm: 
Note: Individual types of AI/ML require specific questions that address their method and 
application. Naïve Bayes is used as a simple example, but Logistic Regression, Random 
Forest, DNNs, or other categorization algorithms could have used the training data 
produced within our sandbox environment. 
Some questions to guide the examination of Naïve Bayes are: 
• How do you trust the behavior in the real world for this Naïve Bayes function? Success 
Rate? Quality of Training Data? How did it compare with other categorization 
algorithms? 
• Was Naïve Bayes the correct selection for this function vs. other algorithms? The choice 
should be based on what gives you the best operational performance and understanding 
of operational limits (Potential OQE: k-fold cross validation comparisons, etc.). How 
reliable will the answers be in the real world? 
• How do you assess the operational limits of this Naïve Bayes (or alternate algorithm) 
categorization function? 
• Did the training set model enough noise/clutter (in this case, less significant attributes 
determined by SMEs for a particular meta-model class) for each class that allows for the 
function to work properly when deployed? Are there sparse data and/or missing data 
issues? How is the bias of the training set and variance of the test determined?  
• How would you ensure simulation configurations (i.e., the training data) are adequately 
covering the real world experiences? Consider optimizing bias (how well it fits the 
training set) and variance (how well it predicts using the test set)—overfitting/under-
fitting. 
• How many types of simulations and how much training data is really enough?  
• Are the attributes used for the assessment really independent?  
• Is the size of the alpha correct? Is this hyper parameter optimally used?  
• Is MAP or Maximum Likelihood better for this calculation? 
Developing defined lists of questions/issues, as described in this paper, allows system safety 
professionals to identify how to increase the inherent safe operation of safety significant AI/ML 
functions. By following the guidance provided, the system safety practitioner can drive important 
discussions on the development of the AI/ML function and thereby potentially influence design 
of the overall system to decrease the mishap risk associated with these specially developed 
functions.  
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